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Abstract 
This paper examines nonmarket interactions among migrants from same origins in 
the urban labor market of Bangkok, Thailand.  We test whether the labor-market 
performance of previous migrants has externalities to that of new migrants who moved 
from the same province of origin.  Our empirical results, which control origin fixed 
effects, time-fixed effects, and origin/year-specific correlated shocks, show that (1) the 
relative size of the migrant population in the market decreases employment probabilities 
of new migrants (negative substitution effect), (2) the employment probability of 
previous migrants increases those of new migrants (positive externalities), and (3) when 
the employment probability of previous migrants approaches to unity, the size effect 
becomes positive, showing informational scale economies.  The results imply that the 
positive informational scale effect dominates the negative substitution effect when the 
efficiency of previous migrants is sufficiently high in the labor market. 
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1.  Introduction 
Upon arrival in a new location, migrants learn about their destination not only by 
themselves but also from others who have migrated from the same origins.  Job searching 
in labor markets is no exception.  To search for jobs, migrants collect information from a 
variety of sources through both market and nonmarket channels.  They can learn from 
vacancy postings at formal job banks as well as more informally from networks of friends 
and neighbors.  These local networks include those who have moved from the place of 
their origin. 
The information flow seems particularly strong among those who have originated 
from the same place (e.g., Banerjee 1983).  If information spills over from more- to less-
experienced migrants (just as skills are transmitted from older to younger workers), the 
information path may create path dependence among migrants.  The success of previous 
migrants in the destination market affects the expected economic value of migration, 
which influences not only the decision to migrate but also, more directly, the labor-
market performance of those who subsequently move, if previous migrants help new 
migrants.  We examine the extent to which the latter effect works.  If previous 
(experienced) migrants inform newly arrived (less experienced) migrants of job 
opportunities, the scale and efficiency of the previous migrants affect those of the recent 
migrants. 
To assess empirically the above-mentioned nonmarket interactions, we use micro 
data of employment status from a metropolis in a developing country:  Bangkok, 
Thailand.  For the purpose of this study, Bangkok has some desirable features.  First, the 
nonmarket externalities are supposed to be stronger in developing countries than in 
developed countries.  This is because in many low-income countries, the formal 
information infrastructure is not yet well developed, and therefore, informal nonmarket 
networks likely substitute for the formal institutions that exist in developed countries. 
Second, the city of Bangkok is the single largest metropolitan area in Thailand 
and is where not only physical capital and technologies, but also human capital, are 2 
concentrated.  In terms of domestic product, the scale of economic activities is far larger 
than any other urban cluster.  Historically, a large-scale migration of labor flows into 
Bangkok.  From an analytical point of view, the exclusive focus on this large city avoids 
potential heterogeneities of labor-demand structure that may come up if we pool different 
cities in the analysis. 
Third, related to the second point, the share of migrants is quite large in the 
Bangkok population.  In 1994￿1996, nearly 20 percent of the population had been there 
fewer than nine years; 13 percent had stayed under five years (Rounds 1 and 3, Labor 
Force Surveys).  For our purpose, the large share of migrants in the Bangkok population 
helps identify the role of migrants￿ networks in the labor market. 
In labor economics, studies of neighborhood or network effects focus attention on 
demographic behavior, schooling investment in children, or other social phenomena such 
as crime.  However, since these network effects are unobservable to researchers, it is 
often difficult to distinguish these external effects from unobserved common factors or 
correlated shocks.  More fundamentally, it is hard to define reference groups (Manski 
1993).  For example, in different contexts, Case (1992), Case and Katz (1991), Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995), Topa (2000), and Yamauchi (2001) examine external effects among 
residents living in the same areas.  Borjas (1995) and O￿Regan and Quigley (1996), on 
the other hand, provide evidence for external effects among people identified with the 
same characteristics, such as ethnic background.  In this paper, the network effect we 
examine is of the latter type, since the reference group is defined by migrants￿ origins. 
The literature on migration has made some progress in the question of identifying 
the network effects among migrants.
1  Banerjee (1983) shows from a survey in Delhi that 
network effects exist in decisions to migrate and in the job search.  Caces et al. (1985) 
examine migration from the Philippines to Hawaii, showing evidence of migrants￿ 
                                                 
1 Although these studies have a static framework, the implications of the nonmarket network effect can be 
also dynamic.  In a dynamic sense, the nonmarket interactions may enhance human capital accumulation.  
If skill accumulates when migrants work, skill formation depends on the employment status, i.e., whether 
or not they work.  Therefore, the strength of the network affects the accumulation of specific human 
capital. 3 
network effects.  Montgomery (1991) shows the importance of informal networks, 
including social networks, in employment determination.  Using the concept of ethnic 
capital, Borjas (1995) examines the effect of previous migrants￿ characteristics on more 
recent migrants by their ethnic background in the United States.  More recently, Munshi 
(2003) identifies network effects among Mexican migrants in the United States, using 
retrospective data on migration and employment history.  In particular, his analysis 
succeeds in controlling for the effects of correlated shocks among migrants from the 
same origins, using regional rainfall data from the area of the migrants￿ origin in Mexico. 
In this paper, we examine more specifically whether the population size and 
efficiency of previous migrants affect employment prospects of recent migrants from the 
same origins in the Bangkok labor market.  In this paper, size is measured by the relative 
share of migrants from a particular area in the migrants￿ whole population.  Efficiency is 
measured by the employment probability estimated among the group of migrants from a 
particular area.  The data come from nonagricultural and agricultural seasons of the Thai 
Labor Force Survey 1994￿1996.  To identify this effect, we control for (1) origin 
province-specific fixed effects, (2) time-specific common shocks, and (3) origin 
province-specific year shocks.  Evidence shows that (1) the size of the migrant population 
has a negative effect on employment probability among recent migrants, due to 
substitution between previous and recent migrants from the same place of origin.  
However, (2) higher employment probability among previous migrants increases 
employment probability among recent migrants.  This result suggests that migrants gain 
from those who are currently employed but not from those who are not.  Moreover, (3) 
the two factors are complementary in the sense that when employment probability is high 
enough among previous migrants, the size effect becomes positive.  Therefore, there 4 
exists a threshold in the number of previous migrants, above which the negative 
substitution effect is dominated by the positive external effect.
2 
In the next section, we discuss a simple framework to clarify theoretical 
predictions.  The empirical methodology is discussed in Section 3.  Section 4 describes 
data from Thailand, and Section 5 summarizes empirical results.  Section 6 presents 
concluding remarks. 
2.  A Simple Framework 
In this section, we discuss migrants￿ information acquisition behavior in a simple 
model.  Our main question is twofold:  (1) are migrants influenced by previous migrants 
from the same area? And (2) if so, are they influenced by competition in the same market 
or positive learning spillovers that enhance the job search? 
The first question assumes that the labor market for migrants is somehow 
segmented between groups of different origins.  Markets can be segmented by occupation 
and industry or by information flow.  For example, if migrants who moved from a 
particular region tend to engage in a certain industry, new migrants likely compete with 
those who have already stayed in the destination, whether employed or not.  If there is no 
such segmentation, the total labor supply in the destination matters in the labor market 
equilibrium and the probability of finding a job.  The size of previous migrant and native 
labor forces has a negative effect on the employment probability of newly arrived 
migrants. 
On the other hand, a large pool of previous migrants may increase the 
employment probability of recent migrants, if the network of migrants from the same 
origin helps recent migrants find jobs.  Assume that migrants receive signals on their job-
search strategy from previous migrants {j} from the same origin, yj = θ + εj , where θ is 
                                                 
2 However, the network effect in general equilibrium of the labor market as a whole depends on the 
substitutability between migrants and nonmigrants, because more employment among migrants can reduce 
opportunities for nonmigrants.  In this paper, we restrict our focus on network effects among insiders 
(migrants), not including those on outsiders (natives). 5 
the parameter that represents the best job-search strategy and εj is stochastic noise, 
following iid  
2 (0 ) N ε σ , .  The signal does not tell about the best strategy perfectly.  The 
actual search strategy taken is z
*.  The optimality of this strategy is measured by a 
quadratic loss function (θ - z
*)
2. 
Assume that employed migrants have better information on where to find a job 
than unemployed migrants do.  Indeed, employed workers have already gone through a 
successful job search.  In Bayesian inference, this informational heterogeneity is 
translated into difference in noise variance, i.e., unemployed agents have a larger noise 
variance of their signals.  Assume that the variance of noise, εj, is larger in unemployed 
than in employed migrants, i.e., 
22 ~ ε ε σ σ > , where 
2 ~ ε σ is the variance for unemployed 
migrants and 
2
ε σ  is that for employed migrants.  In words, signals from the unemployed 
are less reliable than those from the employed. 
With normality assumptions on the prior on θ, agents minimize the expected 
value of the quadratic loss.  In Bayesian terms, newly arrived migrants set their strategy 
at the sample average of signals.  Since noise variance is smaller in the group of 
employed previous migrants, they will start sampling from this group.  Let us analyze the 
condition for additional sampling.  Given that a sample of size k is already taken to form 
z
*, the benefit of additional sampling k + 1 is represented by a reduction of the subjective 
variance.
















                                                 
3 In this paper, we assume that learning occurs in one shot.  However, it is easy to model multi-period 
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Therefore, as long as the noise variance from the  1 k + -th sample migrant is not so 
large, it is optimal for recent migrants to learn from more migrants.  Needless to say, if 
the  1 k + -th migrant is currently employed, the condition holds. 
The employment probability is a function of the job-search strategy loss, the 
population size of previous migrants, and natives in the destination:  
  ( )
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pp
oo p zL L L θ
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where 
p
o L , 
p
o L− , L denote the populations of previous migrants from own origin and other 
regions, and of natives, respectively.  The effect of 
p





















∂  depends on the 
composition of the employed and unemployed.  From the above theory, if an increase in 
0
p L  consists of employed workers, recent migrants are likely to sample them.  On 
average, the variance of (θ - z
*)
2 decreases, so p increases.  In the competitive labor 
market, p2 is negative.  Similarly, p3 and p4 are also negative. 7 
In the empirical analysis below, we use (1) the relative number of previous 






LL − + ), and (2) the estimated 
employment probability of previous migrants from the same province of origin (i.e., the 
ratio of the employed to the total population of previous migrants from the same province 
of origin).  First, given that the employment probability of previous migrants increases p, 





∂  is 
controlled, the effect of (1) is negative.  The following sections provide further details on 
empirical implementation and data. 
3.  Empirical Methodology 
Specification and Identification 
In this section, we discuss the methodology to identify the network effects among 
migrants.  We use the probit model, taking the dependent variable from the employment 
status of recent migrants who have stayed in Bangkok less than one year.  The 
employment status takes the value of 1 (yit = 1) if the worker is employed and zero 
otherwise (yit = 0).  In particular, we assume that 
  ijr ijr jr j r jt ijr yx z v α βγ µ φ ε
∗′ ′ =+ + + ++ + , 
where i, j, r, and t denote individual, province of origin, round, and year, respectively.  
There is more than one round in a year.  In this setting, yir = 1 if  0 ir y
∗ ≥  and yir = 0 if 
0 ir y
∗ <  where  ir y
∗  is a latent employment state variable.  There are two sets of 
explanatory variables above:  individual and household characteristics, xir, and network 
factors specific to the province of origin, zjr.  The error term, εijr, follows the standard 
normal distribution.  As discussed below, zjr is either the (normalized) number of 
previous migrants from same origin r, or estimated employment probability of previous 
migrants.  The previous migrants are defined as those who have stayed in Bangkok more 8 
than one but fewer than five years.  Individual and household characteristics, xir, have 
age, gender, marital status, household size, levels of education completed, and household 
head indicator. 
In this type of empirical exercise, it is challenging to identify origin group-
specific externalities against the group-specific unobserved fixed factors and/or common 
shocks correlated among the group members.  For example, if the quality of education is 
higher in a particular region than in other regions, those who come from that region are 
more likely to be employed than those from other regions.  Since this hidden factor 
affects both previous and recent migrants, the presence of a positive correlation occurs 
between the two groups.  Therefore, if such a region-specific effect is not controlled for 
in estimation, there is a risk of accepting this positive relation as statistical evidence of 
externalities.  Since those unobserved region-specific factors are contained in unobserved 
error terms, it is likely that origin-specific externality variables, i.e., the size of previous 
migrant population or the estimated employment probabilities among previous migrants, 
have correlations with the error terms. 
In this paper, this problem is solved through (1) pooling several cross-sections 
over time (r = 1,...,6) and (2) including origin fixed effects, µj.  Using panel data or 
pooling data from several cross-sections that have time-series variations for each group, 
region-specific fixed effects can be estimated by a region dummy variable.  It should also 
be noted that the external effects estimable in the above method are identified only from 
within-province variations, not from differences in employment status across different 
origin provinces. 
Another issue relevant in the identification of externality effect is that shocks 
correlated among migrants from the same origin change the dependent as well as the 
network variables at the same time.  There are two types of correlated shocks:  supply-
side shocks in origin provinces and demand-side shocks in Bangkok.  Among supply-side 
shocks, agricultural production fluctuations are a major stochastic factor.  Since we pool 
agricultural (August) and nonagricultural (February) season rounds from each year, we 9 
can include origin province year-specific (not round-specific) indicators to capture the 
monsoon-related province-specific agricultural shocks.  In the peak agricultural season 
round, migrants may move back to rural origins to work on agricultural production.  
Weather conditions can affect the employment opportunities in rural areas.  With 
province- and year-specific dummy variables, therefore, we can control for these 
stochastic conditions. 
On the demand-side shocks in the labor market, we do not assume heterogeneities 
among migrants from different origin provinces.  This assumption is quite acceptable, 
except in some industries (e.g., food processing) that are linked closely with agricultural 
production.  In manufacturing industries in general and service sectors, while demand 
shocks can differ between sectors, they equally affect migrants from different regions.  In 
the analysis below, it is assumed that labor demand can shift round by round and 
uniformly between migrants from different origins.  Round-year indicators capture these 
demand-related shocks. 
Scale Effect and Efficiency Effect 
As discussed, we examine two types of nonmarket network variables:  (1) the 
normalized size of previous migrants from the same origin in the migrants￿ total 
population, and (2) the estimated employment probability of previous migrants by 
province of origin.  The former measures the scale of migration from a certain province 
of origin, while the latter measures the efficiency in labor market activities among 
previous migrants. 
There are two possible size effects, following the conventional framework in 
labor economics.  First, if previous and new migrants are simply substitutes in labor 
markets, more previous migration from the same origin makes it difficult for new 
migrants to find jobs in the same markets, given the labor demand.  In this case, the size 
effect is negative.  Second, the expansion of migrants￿ population from the same origin 
may create informational economies of scale, which may dominate the negative 10 
substitution effect.  The more migrants that settle in the destination, the more information 
emerges due to increasing interactions among the migrants.  In this case, the size effect is 
positive.  Therefore, we cannot predict a priori the sign of the size effect.  However, in 
general, the question of whether previous and new migrants are substitutes depends on 
labor-market structure as well as heterogeneity in quality of labor. 
On the other hand, we expect the efficiency effect to be positive, since newly 
arriving migrants can learn about employment opportunities from those who are currently 
employed in the same market.  We can also conjecture that higher labor-market 
efficiency of previous migrants enhances informational scale economies.  In the 
estimation to capture this effect, we include the interaction term of the estimated 
employment probability and the migrant population size by province of origin. 
4. Data 
Labor Force Survey 
This paper uses the Labor Force Survey conducted by Thailand￿s National 
Statistical Office (NSO) in the years 1994 to 1996.  The Labor Force Survey is conducted 
every quarter:  February, May, August, and November.  This paper uses data from 
February (first round) and August (third round) in the three years cited to include 
nonagricultural and peak agricultural seasons each year.  For the purpose of this research, 
we use only the Bangkok sample.  The years 1994￿1996 are regarded as boom years, 
before the Thai financial crisis of 1997￿1998. 
The Labor Force Survey provides rich information on employment, such as 
working hours, payment types, wages, fringe benefits, and so on.  Among them, detailed 
data on migrants such as origin, length of stay in destination, and reasons for migration 
are available.  The labor force is defined as those who are able to work, excluding 
housekeepers or students.  Migrants are defined as people who have lived in the Bangkok 
region fewer than five years, after having moved from non-Bangkok regions.  The survey 
identifies the length of residence in the destination up to nine years.  However, previous 11 
provinces are only recorded for those who have stayed fewer than five years, which 
makes our definition of migrants restricted to those as described above.  Migrants￿ 
origins￿previous provinces￿are divided into 76 provinces; foreign countries are 
another one category.  The distribution of migrants by origin regions is shown in Figure 
1.  The percentage coming from the north is 20.19 percent of all migrants; from the 
northeast, 11.08 percent; from the south, 21.54 percent; and from the central, including 
Bangkok, 25.80 percent. 
 




Six years of elementary school was compulsory from 1994 to 1996.  At higher 
than elementary levels, junior high school and high school take three years for each, and 
college requires four years.  Medical and dental schools require six years.  In Thailand, 
there are three types of vocational schools.  Students can enter after junior high school 
(three years) or after high school (two years).  We use the following education indicators:  
none, less than Pratom 4, lower elementary, elementary, lower secondary, upper 
secondary, lower vocational, upper and higher vocational, university academic, university 
technical vocational, teacher training, short-course vocational, and other. 12 
Network Variables 
Network variables used in our estimation are (1) the normalized share of migrants 
from a particular province in the total population of migrants in Bangkok at a given point 
in time, and (2) the share of the employed that moved from a particular province among 
migrants from the same province in Bangkok at a given point in time.  To estimate the 
number of migrants from a particular province, we need sample weights and the 
estimated total number of migrants￿ population in Bangkok at each round from 1994 to 
1996.  To construct the normalized share, we use the ratio of migrants from a particular 
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where wir is sample weight for migrant i and round/year r, njr is the group of people from 
origin j who have stayed in Bangkok more than one year but fewer than five years, and nr 
is the group of people who migrated from outside Bangkok and have stayed more than 
one year but fewer than five years. By definition, 
rj r j nn =∑ . 
We also calculate the employment probability among the people from a particular 
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We will analyze the effects of these two network variables on the employment 
probabilities of recent migrants￿those who have stayed in Bangkok less than one year. 
Figures 1 and 2 display the distributions of these two origin-specific network 
variables.  The graphs show that employment probabilities by rounds and origin 
provinces are nearly uniformly distributed but with two mass points at extreme values, 13 
while the normalized share is concentrated in small values (nearly 63 percent of the 
origin provinces are less than 0.01, where the maximum is 0.1083). 





Next, Figure 3 displays a positive relationship between the employment 
probabilities and the normalized shares.
4  The positive correlation between these network 
variables implies two phenomena.  First, the self-selection process screens more 
employable agents, and therefore a higher employment probability in the group of 
migrants from a particular region results in its relatively larger size.  Second, if there exist 
informational scale economies in the destination, a higher employment probability results 
in a larger number of migrants.  This process is circular:  higher employment probability 
induces more migration and therefore a larger population size.  In our empirical strategy, 
                                                 
4 It also shows that the variance of employment probability is large if the relative population size is small.  
Though in this paper we do not examine this phenomenon, part of this variation must be attributable to 
sampling errors that may arise from small samples of these relatively small shares of migrants in the 
destination. 14 
the first possibility can be controlled for by origin-province fixed effects and the 
interactions with year indicators, if the propensity to migrate does not change between the 
two rounds in each year. 





However, the positive correlation is not consistent with the selection process in 
the destination.  If the selection process in the destination gradually screens employable 
migrants, the average employment probability will be higher, but the population size of 
migrants who survive in the destination will be smaller as time passes.  In this case, 
therefore, we expect a negative correlation. 
The next section summarizes econometric results. 
5.  Estimation Results 
This section shows our estimation results.  All the specifications include three 
fixed effects:  (1) origin-province fixed effects, (2) origin-province year-specific effects, 





factors and correlated shocks specific to origin provinces are controlled for to avoid 
spurious inference of external origin-specific network effects.  With the time-specific 
fixed effects, labor demand as well as macroeconomic shocks are controlled. 
Table 1 shows results from benchmark specifications that use previous migrants 
age 13 or higher.  In the first and second columns, we include only the normalized size of 
previous migrants from the same origin.  While the linear effect is insignificant, the 
Table 1￿Probit:  Employment equations using previous migrants age 13 or higher 
Dependent:  employed  or  not (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Size 0.0407  12.110      ￿18.550 
  (0.02)  (1.94)    (1.84) 
Size  squared   ￿123.87    ￿91.038 
   (2.26)    (2.07) 
Employment probability      0.1877  1.9678  2.3617 
     (0.74)  (1.42)  (2.24) 
Employment probability squared        ￿1.2877  ￿2.2565 
       (1.30)  (2.34) 
Size * employment probability          30.995 
       ( 2 . 8 7 )  
Age  0.0325 0.0354 0.0315 0.0330 0.0357 
  (0.96) (2.09) (1.82) (1.92) (2.15) 
Age  squared  ￿0.0005 ￿0.0005 ￿0.0004 ￿0.0005 ￿0.0005 
  (2.01) (2.28) (1.96) (2.09) (2.38) 
Male  0.0676 0.0736 0.0630 0.0643 0.0774 
  (0.96) (1.08) (0.91) (0.94) (1.15) 
Head  0.1360 0.1340 0.1336 0.1333 0.1209 
  (3.38) (3.38) (3.38) (3.39) (2.96) 
Single  0.1736 0.1742 0.1742 0.1661 0.1714 
 (3.100  (3.36)  (3.16)  (3.00)  (3.31) 
Household  size  ￿0.0087 ￿0.0081 ￿0.0083 ￿0.0076 ￿0.0063 
  (0.81) (0.77) (0.78) (0.71) (0.63) 
       
Education  indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Origin province fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Round-year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Origin-province year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Number  of  observations  531 531 521 521 521 
Pseudo  R  square  0.4851 0.4904 0.4857 0.4882 0.5024 
Notes:  The parameters shown are changes in probability.  The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t values.  
Robust standard errors are used with origin province-wise clusters.  The specifications include indicators of the level of 
education completed, origin-province fixed effects, round-year fixed effects, and origin-province year fixed effects.  
Size is the normalized share of migrants from a particular province in the migrants￿ total population. 
 16 
positive concave effect is significant with a quadratic term.  It appears that the positive 
informational-scale economy effect dominates the labor-market substitution effect. 
In the third and fourth columns, both linear and quadratic effects of the 
employment probability are insignificant.  This goes against our prediction that currently 
employed migrants can improve employment probability for newly coming migrants.  
However, this specification does not reflect possibilities of interdependence between 
migrants￿ population size and their efficiency in the labor market. 
In the fifth column, we adopt a quadratic approximation with both normalized 
migrants￿ size and employment probability, including their interaction term.  The results 
are that the (1) size effects are negative and convex, (2) employment probability effects 
are positive and concave, and (3) interaction effect is positive.  All these estimates are 
significant. 
The first result suggests that previous migrants are substitutes for recent migrants 
from the same origins in the Bangkok labor market.  With a large pool of previous 
migrants, it becomes difficult for recent migrants to find a job.  It is possible that labor 
markets are segmented across migrants of different origins, and the quality of labor is 
similar between previous and recent migrants. 
The second result implies that if new migrants are interacted with more efficient 
workers (those with jobs), the likelihood of finding a job is greater.  This finding supports 
our main hypothesis that employed migrants who have already stayed for a certain period 
are a key information source for newcomers in the destination market.  However, the 
marginal effect becomes nearly zero as the probability approaches 1. 
More interestingly, the efficiency of previous migrants alters the negative 
substitution effect of the migrants￿ population size.  The positive sign of the interaction 
term means that more efficient migrants enhance informational scale economies.  As the 
employment probability of previous migrants approaches to unity, the size effect 
becomes positive.  Hence, if most of the previous migrants are employed in Bangkok, 
their population size enhances employment opportunities for newly coming migrants. 17 
In Table 2, we check the robustness of our key results in two ways.  First, the 
length of labor-market experience may change the effectiveness of the reference group as 
an information source.  For example, more experienced migrants are not only more likely 
employed, they also become a more efficient information source, since those workers 
know more about working conditions in general.  In order to check the effect of the 
heterogeneities, we construct two network measures for different subpopulations of 
previous migrants:  those age 18 or higher and those age 25 or higher.  The first and 
second columns show quadratic approximation results, comparable to the fifth column in 
Table 1, using previous migrants of age 18 or higher, and 25 or higher, respectively.   
Table 2￿Probit:  Employment equations 
Dependent: employed or not  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Size and employment probability are defined with  Age > 18  Age > 25  Age > 13  Age > 18  Age > 25 
Size  ￿36.430 ￿14.180 ￿18.874 ￿38.554 ￿16.927 
  (2.45) (2.00) (1.86) (2.15) (1.87) 
Size  squared  ￿103.40 26.870 ￿89.180  ￿109.59 17.369 
  (2.11) (0.64) (2.05) (2.25) (0.36) 
Employment probability  1.0668 2.9959 3.1120 1.2011 3.4192 
  (0.97) (1.97) (2.35) (0.83) (2.12) 
Employment probability squared  ￿1.2815 ￿2.0627 ￿2.5798 ￿1.4493 ￿2.3427 
  (1.23) (1.85) (2.55) (1.29) (2.02) 
Size * employment probability  47.762  10.629  29.610  49.159  13.339 
  (2.53) (1.22) (2.58) (2.41) (1.34) 
Years schooling * size      0.5807  0.4258  0.2706 
     (1.08)  (0.83)  (0.68) 
Years schooling * employment probability     0.0105  0.0371  0.0151 
     (0.19)  (0.63)  (0.33) 
Age * size      ￿0.0658  ￿0.0529  ￿0.0369 
     (0.60)  (0.48)  (0.49) 
Age * employment probability      ￿0.0090  ￿0.0007  ￿0.0091 
     (0.67)  (0.05)  (1.18) 
Male * size      ￿0.0131  0.3164  0.5297 
     (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.25) 
Male * employment probability     ￿0.3917  ￿0.3431  0.1669 
     (1.31)  (1.27)  (0.70) 
       
Origin-province fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round-year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Origin-province year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations  521  503  521  521  503 
Pseudo R square  0.4939 0.4885 0.5168 0.5033 0.4973 
Notes:  The parameters shown are changes in probability.  Age, age squared, education level, male, head, single 
indicators, and household size are included.  The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t values.  Robust standard 
errors are used with origin province-wise clusters.  The specifications include indicators of the level of education 
completed, origin-province fixed effects, round-year fixed effects, and origin-province year fixed effects.  Size is the 
normalized share of migrants from a particular province in the migrants￿ total population. 18 
Estimates are quite similar to the benchmark result (Table 1, column 5) in signs of the 
parameters, except a few differences in the level of significance.  The results show (1) 
negative and convex effects of migrants￿ size, (2) positive and concave effects of 
migrants￿ efficiency, and (3) complementarity between the population size and efficiency 
of previous migrants.  Key findings seem to remain robust to this experiment. 
Next we check how individual attributes alter the efficiency of information 
acquisition from previous migrants￿ networks.  Years of schooling, age, and gender 
indicators are interacted with both the normalized size and employment probability.  The 
level of education measures general human capital, which may enhance information 
acquisition from existing networks, as is the ability to deal with disequilibria (Schultz 
1975).  Age is also included to represent labor-market experience, which may also 
enhance the utilization of informational flows through networks.  Note that since we use 
as the source group those of destination experience fewer than five years, age mainly 
captures the labor-market experience in their origins.  The results are shown in columns 
3, 4, and 5.  The estimates are not significant enough to reach any conclusion on the 
above hypotheses.  Education, age, and gender do not matter in learning from networks.  
This result conflicts with a finding by Yamauchi (2004) that educated migrants learn 
efficiently from their destination experience in the Bangkok labor market. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper shows that an external effect exists in the channels from previous 
migrants to newly arrived migrants of the same province of origin.  In the Bangkok labor 
market, the employment probability of recent migrants is affected by both the population 
size and efficiency of previous migrants originating from the same region.  A large 
population size of previous migrants per se decreases employment opportunities among 
new migrants, while more employment among previous migrants raises the employment 
probability of new migrants.  The above results imply that previous and recent migrants 
are substitutable in the Bangkok labor market and that the key information source for 19 
recent migrants is those who are currently employed.  More interestingly, when previous 
migrants are highly efficient, a large population size of previous migrants enhances 
employment prospects among newly arrived migrants.  Only when most previous 
migrants are employed in the market does the size of the local network exhibit 
information scale economies. 
The evidence for the migrants￿ nonmarket interactions is robust to unobserved 
factors that easily create correlations between the network variables and employment 
status of recent migrants:  (1) origin-province fixed effects, which eliminate spurious 
correlations due to unobserved region-specific fixed factors, (2) origin-province year-
specific effects, which reflect supply-side shocks correlated among same-origin migrants, 
e.g., fluctuations in agricultural production in the province of origin that alter opportunity 
costs of being in Bangkok, and (3) time-specific common shocks, which affect all 
migrants both previous and recent and from any regions at the same time. 
The period covered in this analysis corresponds to three years immediately before 
the Thai financial crisis of 1997.  Some evidence shows a structural change in the 
Bangkok labor market during this crisis:  returns to destination experience for migrants 
drastically decreased, though returns to schooling remained constant (Yamauchi 2002), 
while other evidence shows that the impact of the crisis on the Bangkok labor force is 
relatively small (Behrman and Tinakorn 2000).  The question of whether migrants￿ 
networks worked to help those vulnerable during the crisis is an interesting question but 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 20 
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